EDITORIAL

The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1

Land Release Liability
Who should be responsible for any adverse events after clearance? The process of transferring
liability from an operator to the state seems biased due to an inherent conflict of interest.

by Sean Moorhouse [ Mine Action Consulting ]

I

f a mine/explosive remnant of war (ERW) accident occurs
in previously released land, who is liable for the damage
caused? This is a question that many national mine action

authorities (NMAA) ask and one that I was asked in Laos and
Bosnia-Herzegovina during two recent workshops on liability
in mine action, which were facilitated by the Geneva International Centre on Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) guide
mine action organizations by establishing principles and specifying international requirements in mine action. IMAS 07.11,
Amendment No. 2, released 1 March 2013, contains important
elements that help point the way toward answering questions
on liability. Moreover, the amendment raises a few additional
questions of its own, which require answers if IMAS is to be
thoroughly implemented.
Land Release Clarification

Known for being difficult to translate into languages other than English, the term land release has become problematic
over the years. In addition, although most people in the mine
action community have a good understanding of land release,

All photos courtesy of the author.

many continue to conflate land release (land determined as be-

What happens when released land is found to contain

ing safe to use) with land cancellation (land never contaminat-

an unexploded device or an explosion occurs? IMAS 07.11

ed). Combining the two concepts into one can cause confusion.

uses the term adverse event to describe such incidents.

Land release—an evidence-based threat assessment de-

Unfortunately, these adverse events will occur from time

termining where full clearance is or is not required—is only

to time. Although perfection is the goal, it cannot always

concerned with increasing the efficiency of mine action activi-

be achieved; some mines/ERW might be missed during the

ties. Like anything in the dynamic world of mine action, land

clearance process.

release is subject to constant refinements, which explains why

IMAS 07.11 contains three key elements that determine liability in the event that any adverse event occurs:

the latest IMAS 07.11 came into being.
The new IMAS 07.11 describes land release as “… an evidence-based decision-making process that helps determine
with confidence which land needs further action and which

• Reasonable effort
• Residual risk
• Transfer of liability from operator to state

does not. It involves the identification of hazardous areas, the

IMAS 07.11 describes all reasonable effort as “… a minimum

cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduc-

acceptable level of effort to identify and document contami-

tion of land through technical survey and the clearance of

nated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/

land with actual mine/ERW contamination.”

ERW. ‘All reasonable effort’ has been applied when the com-
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This 13-year-old Sri Lankan boy lost his foot while working in
his family’s garden after the area was partially cleared.
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mitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected.”1
NMAA should define what actions and parameters make
up all reasonable effort for the different processes concerned.
For example, in areas where clearance is deemed necessary,
national standards determine a minimum clearance depth
and target size for clearance. For metal detectors, the target
size is determined as the smallest piece of metal the detector
must be able to find, to represent the signal of the mines/ERW
being cleared. For animal detection systems, it is the smallest
explosive trace.
The second element, residual risk, is unavoidable. A residual risk of encountering mines/ERW in any post-conf lict
country will always exist, yet with every item found and
destroyed, risk is reduced (albeit not entirely eliminated).
Even in manually cleared areas, using all reasonable—or
even unreasonable—effort, a chance always remains that an
item was missed. Mine action’s goal is to reduce that risk to

A mine was found and marked in an area declared clear of
mines in Sri Lanka.

a tolerably low level. Each NMAA must determine its own

When land is released, regardless of the method used, a

risk-tolerance level.

formal handover process should take place where the operator

The third and final element is the transfer of liability from

relinquishes liability to NMAA, an agent of the state. There-

the operator to the state. IMAS defines liability as “… any le-

fore, the responsibility should immediately transfer to the

gal responsibility, duty or obligation that a country, organisa-

state when a formal handover process occurs. Additionally, li-

tion or individual may have. Liability in relation to an adverse

ability handover should be a clearly and explicitly identified

event, such as an accident or the discovery of a missed item in

moment in time.

an area, is normally linked to non-compliance with an agreed
policy or procedure.”1

On the other hand, NMAA may wish to delay this
handover for as long as possible, so that the operator retains
liability. This delaying tactic should not be allowed, because

Transfer of Liability

if there are concerns about the quality of the work, NMAA

IMAS 07.11 assumes the operator is liable for any damages that may occur during clearance—which, although un-

would require that the operator solve the problems and
certify the work’s completion.

derstandable, seems a little unfair. After all, the operator was
not responsible for placing mines/ERW in the area. Worse, if

Holding an Operator Liable

the clearance organization had not taken all of the physical

However, IMAS 07.11 states that an operator will, at least in

risks involved in clearing the devices, it would have assumed

principle, retain some liability in cases of incidents caused by

no liability and the land would still be contaminated. Yet in

suspected missed mines/ERW in four circumstances. Specifi-

deciding to clear the devices—whether for profit or humani-

cally, some liability is retained if an investigation shows that

tarian purposes—the operator effectively becomes liable for

“i) the accident was caused by wilful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct or a con-

any damages caused during clearance.
IMAS clarifies that the operator is liable if an accident occurs during the operation, but at what point does the state as-

scious, f lagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the
individual(s) harmed;

sume liability? In areas with no evidence of contamination,

ii) the organisation was not properly accredited, licensed,

land is released to the community without executing any

certified or authorised to carry out acts leading to the errone-

technical survey or full clearance. The non-technical survey

ous land release decision;

process is specified according to national standards, implemented by the operator and quality managed by NMAA. Is
there any difference in the operator’s liability if an adverse
event occurs in an area released without being processed?
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iii) the organisation wilfully infringed prevailing national
policy or standards;
iv) the organisation had conducted gross procedural errors
or grossly deviated from an agreed land release concept.”1
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CWD Response to Ammunition
Depot Accidents
   

more dangerous because they can injure or kill thousands of civilians and military personnel in a
single incident. These detonations are not a new occurrence; they have happened as far back as
World War I.

FOCUS

While casualties inevitably occur during wars as a result of hostilities, munitions explosions are far

by COL. George Zahaczewsky [ U.S. Army, Retired ]

QRF personnel conduct ordnance removal activities in February 2009 following a munitions depot explosion in
Chelopechene, Bulgaria.
All photos courtesy of QRF.

O

n 6 December 1917, during World War I, nearly

conventional munitions explosion to date, with a force equiv-

2,000 people were killed and an additional 9,000

alent to 2.9 kilotons of explosives.2

were injured in one accident, when a French am-

During World War II, on 5 June 1941, several thousand

munition ship, the SS Mont Blanc, collided with a Norwegian

people were killed in a single instance in the city of Smederevo,

cargo vessel, the SS Imo, in Halifax Harbor, Nova Scotia,

on the outskirts of Belgrade, when 400,000 tons of ammuni-

Canada. The collision sparked a fire that ignited over 2,500

tion stored in the city center by German occupation forces

tons of munitions aboard the Mount Blanc. The cargo in-

detonated.3 Additionally, during the war period (1939–1954),

cluded 2,325 tons of picric acid, 225 tons of TNT, 21 tons of

there were at least six other major events involving munitions

guncotton (nitrocellulose) and 35 tons of benzene. Until the

being transported or stored that were not directly attributable

advent of nuclear weapons in 1945, this was the largest man-

to hostile action, which resulted in nearly 2,000 deaths of mili-

made explosion and is still the world’s largest unplanned,

tary and civilian personnel.4
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The aftermath of a 2012 ammunition depot explosion in Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo.

Between 1995 and May 2010, nearly 218 incidents involving ammunition depots occurred, resulting in at least

ment, equipment, training and deployment costs of a quick
reaction force (QRF) with worldwide availability.

4,700 fatalities and 5,700 injuries.4,5 These instances can

DI provided the necessary support infrastructure, as well

have the same detrimental effects on populations, infra-

as a team of highly qualified and certified weapons remov-

structure and development as landmines and explosive

al and abatement technical specialists, in order to swiftly de-

remnants of war.4,5,6 Arguably the largest one of these catas-

stroy conventional weapons caches and remove potentially

trophes took place in Lagos, Nigeria, on 27 January 2002.

deadly explosive munitions. From September 2008 through

An explosion at the Ikeja ammunition depot in the center

September 2013, QRF responded to 25 urgent situations in-

of Lagos resulted in more than 1,100 civilian and military

volving CWD, including three post-accident clearance oper-

deaths with an additional 5,000 injured. The accident also

ations in ammunition storage areas in Bulgaria, Democratic

displaced 20,000 people and destroyed much of the north-

Republic of the Congo and Tanzania.

ern part of the city.4,5 A fire near the depot reportedly initiated the explosion; however, other reports attribute the
accident’s cause to the aged and deteriorated condition of
the stored ordnance.

On 3 July 2008, a series of 11 unexplained explosions at
the Chelopechene ammunition depot near Sofia, Bulgaria,

4,5

According to the U.S. Department of State (DOS), the

rocked Chelopechene and the surrounding area. The ex-

U.S. has provided assistance in promoting the safe dispos-

plosions forced the evacuation of 1,700 of the 2,500 resi-

al of surplus weapons and aging munitions since 2001.

4,5,6

dents that lived in the town, and the airport was temporarily

Recognizing the need to respond immediately to emer-

closed.7 Most of the approximately 1,600–2,500 tons of obso-

gency situations involving conventional weapons de-

lete munitions and 15–20 tons of explosives stored at the de-

struction (CWD), the Office of Weapons Removal and

pot were damaged, constituting a danger.7,8 At the request of

Abatement in the U.S. DOS Bureau of Political-Military

the Bulgarian government, a two-person QRF team was sent

Affairs (PM/WRA) awarded DynCorp International (DI)

to Sofia on 22 November 2008 to assess the Chelopechene

a five-year contract in September 2008 to cover recruit-

facility. Following discussions with Bulgarian officials, an

https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol18/iss2/1
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Bulgaria, January 2009
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Surplus SA/LW Destruction Project
in Mauritania
Handicap International, in partnership with the NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund for Mauritania,
implemented a multiphase ammunition and conventional weapons destruction project to help the
Mauritanian government achieve its security objectives and reduce the risk of unplanned explosions.

by Philippe Houliat [ Handicap International ]

H

andicap International (HI) was founded in 1982 to
bring assistance to victims of anti-personnel (AP)
landmines living in the refugee camps on the bor-

der between Cambodia and Thailand. In 1997, HI was chosen
as co-laureate of the Nobel Peace Prize for its role in the international campaign to ban AP landmines, and HI is a key
international player in the field of armed violence reduction.
Among other projects, HI is lending its experience in ammunition and conventional weapons destruction (CWD) to
a project in Mauritania aimed at increasing civilian security
by improving the management of the country’s weapons and
ammunition stores.
Mauritania has experienced more than 30 years of political instability, including 13 successful or attempted coups and
other internal armed conflicts.1 During this time, poor secu-

rity at weapons and ammunition depots and the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) heightened
instability in the country and surrounding region.
International Cooperation and Assistance

Since joining the Mediterranean Dialogue in February 1995,
Mauritania has secured international assistance for its CWD
project through the NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund.2
The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA)—now
the NATO Support Agency (NSPA)—launched the NATO
Trust Fund for Mauritania in 2010. Governed by a framework
agreement, the project has three main goals:

• Increase the security of Mauritania’s civilian population
by reducing the risk of ammunition and weapons theft
from government depots

• Strengthen the skills of the personnel in charge of ammunition storage management

• Provide training on reintegration for Mauritanian army
personnel returning to civilian life

https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol18/iss2/1
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Preparation of and grouping of MANPADS for
destruction.
All graphics courtesy of the author.

Under Italy’s leadership, the project is also financed by
several other NATO countries—Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey,
the U.K. and the U.S. Although not a part of the Trust Fund,
Germany’s financial support for HI is critical to the project’s
mission: safe destruction of ammunition and weapons identified as decommissioned or obsolete by the Mauritanian army.
The project’s total budget is €2.25 million (US$3,111,302 as of
23 April 2014), and it will be completed before the end of 2014.
Destruction Campaign: Preparatory Phase

HI seconded an expatriate technical adviser to work alongside the Mauritanian army’s explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) technicians to foster capacity building through the
systematic and continuous transfer of skills.
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N°

Category

Origin

Quantity (units)

Weight (tons)

1

Cartridge <
_ 20 mm

various

11,167,649

820

2

Shell 23 to 75 mm

various

54,453

79

mines. The concurrent- and post-recording processes used
during MANPADS destruction corresponded with NATO operating procedures.

3

Shell 90 to 122 mm

various

14,076

758

As no available incinerator could destroy the 820 tons of

4

Mortar

various

48,342

272

ammunition of 14.5 mm caliber or more within a reasonable

5

Rocket

various

589

7

timeframe, an open burning technique was employed. SOP

6

Grenade

various

10,229

4.22

7

Mine

various

2,329

14

was to dig 1 m x 2.5 m x 1.5 m (1 yd x 2.7 yd x 1.6 yd) burn pits

8

Explosive

various

42

0.01

9

Pyrotechnic items

various

2,545

2

10

Missile

various
TOTAL

444

7

133,049

1,963.23

Figure 1. Summary of ammunition destroyed.

The prepatory phase of HI’s destruction campaign involved setting up the NAMSA office, making initial contact
with military authorities, finalizing procedures to access
military depots and integrating the international expert
into the Mauritanian destruction team. As no national regulations were in place, standard operating procedures (SOP)
were drafted and included specific procedures for destroying man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and for
cutting weapons. These documents were based on prevailing international standards (the International Ammunition
Technical Guidelines and International Small Arms Control
Standards), and the government of Mauritania approved

in which large quantities of cartridges could be destroyed at
once. The metallic waste after combustion was recycled.
SA/LW Elimination Phase

SA/LW elimination activities began with identifying suitable premises for destruction operations, which were then
rehabilitated to align with international standards. The specific destruction equipment, including an oxyacetylene cutting system, a metal-cutting chainsaw and personal protective
equipment, was then purchased and installed.
Cutting operators were trained in

•
•
•
•

Identifying and recording SA/LW for destruction
Using cutting tools
Drafting destruction reports consistent with SOPs
Recycling metallic waste

Lastly, with the assistance of HI’s expert, a dismantling
plan was drawn up for the 2,300 SA/LW; the Mauritanian
army then implemented it.

them on 1 June 2011.
Because of the distances between the 20 separate ammunition depots that needed clearing, destruction operations
were grouped to 12 sites. This reduced transport costs and optimized available logistical resources. Additionally, the four
EOD technicians in charge of destruction organized two
weeks of refresher training and focused on security measures

Overview of the NATO Project

Constructing NATO-standard ammunition depots. In western Mauritania, two new depots were built in Aleg and Akjoujt
to international standards in order to replace the 20 storage
sites spread across the country, one of which used to be located in the capital, Nouakchott. These can store approximately

to be applied during destruction and burning activities.

750 tons of ammunition.

Ammunition Destruction Phase

ing’s purpose was to provide 20 storekeepers and six managers

Training in ammunition depot management. This train-

The destruction phase lasted from June 2011 to March

of ammunition depots with the technical knowledge needed

2012 and eliminated 1,963 tons of ammunition of all calibers.

to manage ammunition safely and efficiently. The training was

In the course of these activities, the EOD team covered 19,534

delivered in Arabic and French over a period of three weeks

km (12,138 mi) while traveling to the 12 destruction sites lo-

and focused on storage procedures, management and ac-

cated throughout Mauritania. A mechanical digger created

counting, as well as the safe handling, maintenance and elim-

335 demolition pits, and with supervision of an HI expert, the

ination of ammunition.

Mauritanian military hand-dug the pits when the destruc-

Reintegrating military personnel. Intended to help former

tion zone was too isolated to allow transport of the mechani-

military and internal security personnel return to civilian life,

cal digger.

this component is an important step in strengthening relations

Detonation destroyed ammunition calibers greater than

between the army and civil society. HI helped set up training

or equal to 20 mm, including MANPADS, because other tech-

courses in five trades: carpentry, electricity, masonry, plumb-

niques were unavailable in the country. To optimize priming

ing and welding. By the end of 2013, 145 former soldiers, aged

of explosions, the EOD team used obsolete anti-tank land-

23 to 62 years old had participated in training sessions.

Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2014
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Building National EOD Capacity
in Mali
Since January 2013, the United Nations Mine Action Service has worked to build Mali’s national
capacity in explosive ordnance disposal.

by Jin-Hee Dieu [ UNMAS ]

Participants from the Malian Defense Security Forces receive their EOD Level 1 training certificates.
Photo courtesy of UNMAS/Marc Vaillant.

R

ecent and ongoing armed conflicts in Mali have re-

enhancing Mali’s national capacity to mitigate the explosive

sulted in small arms and light weapons proliferation

threats that emerged following the outbreak of armed con-

and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamina-

flict in 2012.2 UNMAS coordinates training activities with

tion, threatening civilians and impeding stabilization efforts.

the Malian Defense and Security forces and operates under

In the northern affected communities, ERW contamination

the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission

increases risks of accidents and injury, and hinders the safe

in Mali (MINUSMA), which the U.N. Security Council estab-

return of more than 170,000 refugees and 187,000 internally

lished in April 2013.3

displaced persons.1

Historical tensions in northern Mali and border fighting

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has

between Tuareg tribes created thousands of refugees. The in-

operated in Mali since January 2013 with the principal goal of

stability and conflict progressed until Alpha Oumar Konaré

Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2014
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A simulation exercise in a city environment. After having secured a safe perimeter, the trainee is creating a safe path to the
suspicious car.
Photo courtesy of UNMAS/Donat Blugeon.

became president in 1992 and issued a peace agreement al-

freedom of movement and inhibit economic recovery within

leviating ethnic disputes. However, the political stability

northern Mali. ERW contamination also limits the deploy-

in Mali was disturbed again during a 2012 rebellion within

ment of national and international forces tasked with stabiliz-

the northern region. At the start of 2012, insurgents gained

ing the north and consolidating security. UNMAS technical

control of the Malian army’s weaponry, leaving civilians and

assistance enhances awareness of this threat and equips units

militants at risk. Fatalities of Malian armed forces during

to address this danger.

4

5

6

Islamist insurgent attacks yielded a military coup ousting

UNMAS aims to build Mali’s capacities to plan, lead and

former President Amadou Toumani Touré in March 2012.7

conduct explosive ordnance clearance. To this end, UNMAS

The administration and military were then reorganized.

and various partners provided explosive ordnance disposal

UNMAS continues responding to these changes and provid-

(EOD) training for Malian military engineer units, gendar-

ing assistance to Malian authorities as they work to restore

merie, national police, civil protection force, national guard

peace and security.

and air force. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB in

Addressing the Explosive Threat in Mali

to March 2013, and taught 36 participants about EOD method-

Improvised explosive devices, ERW and landmines af-

ologies, safety procedures, and types of ammunition and their

fect livelihoods—especially agricultural activities—restrict

components. MSB coordinated the second training session in

https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol18/iss2/1
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Swedish) provided the initial training, which ran from February
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Arms Management and Destruction
in Sahel and Maghreb
Increased illicit weapons proliferation after the 2011 conflict in Libya has contributed to insecurity
throughout the Sahel and Maghreb regions in Africa, which has led to demands for regional arms
management and destruction programs such as one implemented by MAG (Mines Advisory Group).

by Chris Loughran, Julia Wittig and Greg Crowther [ MAG (Mines Advisory Group) ]

H

uman security in the Sahel and Maghreb regions in
Africa has deteriorated in recent years as a result of
armed violence. The prevalence of non-state armed

groups that often operate regionally has exacerbated weak
state control over remote and border areas. For actors operat-

ing in the arms management and destruction sector, addressing fragility in this context requires innovative and integrated
approaches to building stability and resilience.1
Instability and state fragility contributes to and enables
the growing proliferation of weapons and ammunition in
the Sahel and Maghreb regions. The increased availability of
weapons to non-state armed groups allows them to engage
more effectively with poorly equipped and poorly trained national armed forces, particularly in border areas, and to consolidate control over large swathes of countries such as Mali
and Niger. Similarly, arms are more likely to be diverted to the
illicit market when responsible institutions lack capacity and
accountability. Criminal groups may seize weapons or security sector personnel may sell them.
In this complex and dynamic environment, considering fragility, stability and resilience at a regional level is increasingly important when analyzing the context and need
for arms management and destruction in project design. Pro-

Map courtesy of the U.S. Library of Congress.

grams also have increased value when they link to security

linked informally or formally to state actors and non-state

sector reform initiatives and complement civil society efforts

armed groups.3 This interrelationship between transnation-

to develop community based solutions to armed violence and

al organized crime, terrorism and conflict is a core enabler

illicit weapons.

in the supply and demand of illicit weapons and ammunition

Conflict, Fragility and Proliferation

The flow of illicit weapons and ammunition across the

throughout the region.
Libya’s 2011 conflict increased instability in the region,

Sahel and Maghreb regions is not a new phenomenon.

especially in Mali. Significant numbers of trained fighters

Criminal groups have long exploited established transnation-

armed with Libyan weaponry crossed the border following

al trading networks to assist in the movement of drugs, arms

the overthrow of Moammar Gadhafi’s regime. In parallel,

and other contraband. These criminal networks are often

the inability of transitional authorities in Libya to establish

2
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The Sahel and Maghreb regions are found in northern Africa.
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control over weapons stores and munition depots led to significant diversion and a rapid increase in the availability and
quantity of illicit arms. Specific arms identified include BM21 multiple-launch rocket systems, recoilless rifles and OG-82
rockets with anti-personnel warheads.4
The consequences of Mali’s increased level of conflict include population displacement and escalating levels of political tension throughout the region. The situation remains
volatile, despite the intervention of French military forces and
subsequent deployment of the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali under Security Council
resolution 2100 in April 2013.5
The links between the conflicts in Libya and fragility in
Mali are clear, but the flow of weapons across porous borders
within the Sahel and Maghreb regions also has wide-ranging
implications for broader regional stability. Human Rights
Watch Emergency Director Peter Bouckaert noted in 2011
that “weapon(s) proliferation out of Libya is potentially one
of the largest we have ever documented—2003 Iraq pales
by comparison—and so the risks are equally much more
significant.”6 The In Amenas terrorist attack in Algeria
was launched in part from Libya using Libyan weapons.7

Coast guard armory built by MAG in Berbera, Somaliland,
in 2013. Armories are furnished with lockable gun racks
and armory managers are trained in safety procedures. In
this photo, an armory manager takes a coast guard officer’s
weapon card to the numbered slot in a gun rack to retrieve
his assigned weapon.
Photo courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.

Similarly, the ready availability of arms has exacerbated

Weakened national infrastructure in some locations where

border clashes related to smuggling in recent years across the

MAG provides assistance means that society and communi-

borders of Chad, Libya and Niger.8 Increased terrorist activity

ty institutions take primary responsibility for daily security.

in southern Tunisia and Egypt relies in part on the availability

In these cases, with approval of relevant authorities, MAG

of significant amounts of weapons flowing out of Libya.9

also works with communities to address the effects of unguarded weapons and munitions by delivering risk education,

Arms Management and Destruction

which reduces small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) asso-

Increased awareness of the regional implications of

ciated risks and promotes safe storage. This form of support,

poorly managed national stockpiles and of the role illicit

pioneered in Somalia, normally includes initiatives that aim

weapons play in sustaining and fueling armed violence has

to reduce the risk of small arms accidents within communi-

led to a growing focus on reducing illicit availability of arms.

ties. Both activities raise awareness of potential consequences

Many states request assistance from the international donor

and help reduce intentional and unintentional risk-taking be-

community and specialist agencies, such as MAG (Mines

havior. While SA/LW risk education is relatively easy to adapt

Advisory Group), to identify and implement projects aimed at

across regions and borders, other aspects of arms manage-

improving weapons and ammunition management practices.

ment and destruction programs are politically sensitive and

MAG has extensive experience implementing arms man-

need to be tailored according to local circumstances.

agement and destruction programs in a range of countries in-

Context analysis and continued stakeholder engagement

cluding Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya,

are central elements of successful assistance projects. Pro-

Somalia and South Sudan.10 This includes the destruction of

grams not rooted in these principles have little chance of de-

surplus weapons and munitions; rehabilitation, relocation

livering long-term successes. Prospects for sustainability are

and construction of armories and munitions stores; training

greatest when national authorities engage at multiple levels.

of armorers and ammunition storage personnel; and capacity

Even when training is delivered at the local or small-unit lev-

building of managers and leaders. Initial assistance projects

el, senior leadership and political engagement and support

often focus on low-cost, high-impact improvements that act

are critical.

as a basis for more sustained, long-term efforts to build national capacity and infrastructure.

Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2014
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Promoting Firearms Marking in
Latin America and the Caribbean
Marking firearms is an important step in combating illicit weapons trafficking. To promote
marking and tracing among countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Organization of American States has strengthened national capacities to mark firearms by providing equipment and related training since 2009.

by Lourdes Rincón [ Organization of American States ]

I

n the last decade, more than one million people died in

requires firearms to be marked upon manufacture and

Latin America and the Caribbean as a result of crimi-

importation to ensure the security of national firearms

nal violence. Moreover, according to statistical infor-

stockpiles, as well as the exchange of information with

mation on citizen security provided by members of the

other CIFTA signatories with respect to national control

Organization of American States (OAS), 75 percent of in-

mechanisms and illicit-trafficking patterns.

1

tentional homicides in the Americas were committed

Permanently marking a firearm with identifiable

with a firearm. The proportion of intentional homicides

information, such as a serial number, name, place of

by firearms was even higher for South America and Central

manufacturer or importer, model, and caliber, is con-

America, at 83 percent and 78 percent, respectively.

sidered an important step in combating illicit firearms

2

Despite significant progress made in consolidating

trafficking. Marked items are easier to trace and link

democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean during

to crimes in which they were used, thus increasing law

the last decades, the countries of the region still face con-

enforcement and prosecutorial capabilities. By increas-

siderable challenges in tackling armed violence. Public

ing tracing abilities, states are able to identify trafficking

security constitutes a high priority for citizens and re-

routes and arms traffickers more effectively, and can

gional government authorities.

prosecute them accordingly.

Numerous factors contribute to armed violence
such as weak governance, poverty, rapid urbaniza-

Beginning in September 2009, OAS-DPS implement-

ever, easy access to illicit firearms is undoubtedly one

ed the project Promoting Firearms Marking in Latin

of the main factors.

America and the Caribbean. With initial and subse-

Adopted in 1997, the Inter-American Convention

quent contributions totaling US$1,182,493 from the

against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in

Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S.

Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related

Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

Materials (CIFTA) provides a regional framework for

(PM/WRA), OAS-DPS sought to strengthen national ca-

addressing the control and management of firearms as a

pacities to mark imported, exported or confiscated fire-

necessary step for ensuring greater citizen security and

arms in accordance with CIFTA legal requirements.

reducing armed violence. As the technical secretariat for

Through this project, beneficiary countries were eli-

CIFTA, the OAS Department of Public Security (OAS-

gible to receive at least one dot-peen marking machine,

DPS) implemented corresponding efforts to support OAS

which uses small dots to mark products for identifica-

member states in fulfilling their obligations to adopt leg-

tion, related equipment and training.3 To do so, inter-

islative measures criminalizing the illicit manufacturing

ested countries needed to agree to the terms outlining

and trafficking of firearms under domestic law. CIFTA

the equipment’s maintenance and use by signing a
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tion and a lack of employment opportunities. How-
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a victim assistance unit as specified in their strategic plan,
titled Safe Path Forward. The plan calls for the creation
and management of a national database for landmine/UXO
incidents. Such a database will not only depict which areas to
prioritize for clearance and mine risk education (MRE) tasks
but also the number of survivors and their specific needs. This
information will then be factored into future public health
initiatives.11 UXO-NRA has conducted the Lao National
UXO Victim and Accident Phase 1 Survey, which identified
particular areas with high concentrations of UXO incidents
and recurring characteristics of survivors such as activities,
occupations, age and gender.12
Disability Rights in Laos

While ratifying the CRPD is undoubtedly a step toward
the fulfillment of disability rights, the focus on disability
rights is not a new trend in Laos. Laos passed several national laws addressing issues disabled people face. As a result of
its revision in 2003, the Laotian Constitution now guarantees that disabled persons will receive social security benefits and receive time off work in the event of incapacitation
or disability.13
Additional national laws, such as the amended Labour Law
of Lao People’s Democratic Republic of 2006, further address
issues disabled people encounter. This legislation encourages
employers to give disabled persons positions with pay comparable to other workers and calls for employers to provide assistance to those disabled during work or while commuting.
Those who fail to comply with this law may receive a warning
or fine, have their business suspended or license revoked, and
legal action may be taken against them. While the law does
address issues such as providing suitable jobs and aid in the

A child looks out of a window of a house that uses bombies
to hold down the roof. The prevalence of UXO in Laos is a primary cause of the high rate of disabled people in the country.
Photo courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.

case of work-related disability, it fails to protect disabled peo-

the implementation” of the CRPD.7 The decree further

ple in areas such as workplace discrimination. The law states

clarified that NCDP is to coordinate disability-related policies

that the employer and the employee should mutually benefit

and programs in Laos, conduct nationwide needs surveys and

without “discrimination as to race, nationality, gender, age,

produce statistics depicting the distribution of various types

religion, beliefs and socio-economic status.” Missing from

of disabilities and disabled peoples’ needs.16 NCDP has the

this clause, as well as other national legislation, is any ex-

advantage of access to government-controlled information

plicit prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability.

channels such as newspapers, radio broadcasts and television.15

14

Because disability-based discrimination is not explicitly prohibited, legal action cannot remedy such situations.15

Challenges for Disabled People

In 1995, the Prime Minister’s Office issued a decree

To fully participate within society, often disabled people

establishing the National Committee for Disabled People

must overcome physical and attitudinal barriers. In Laos,

(NCDP).16 However, the roles and responsibilities of NCDP

many live in rural settings where rough roads and topog-

are not clearly outlined in the decree. A second decree

raphy limit mobility. Weather indirectly, yet significantly,

was passed in 2009, shortly after Laos signed the CRPD,

impacts disabled people in Laos. During the rainy seasons,

aligning the responsibilities of NCDP with the convention’s

numerous rural roads become nearly impassable by foot.

requirement for structure to “promote, protect, and monitor

Many public and commercial buildings feature a set of front
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integrated into the government structure. GICHD explicitly states that “transition requires a commitment
of more national resources with a parallel reduction of
external assistance.”1 In other words, states must consciously decide to support transition while compensating
for reduced international funding to become successfully
self-sufficient.
After making the decision in April 2001 to transition,
Azerbaijan successfully transferred its mine action capacity to national ownership by 2004. Through its experience, the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action
(ANAMA) suggested that transition processes require
Mechanical demining in Laos.

three basic elements: “a decision as to what should be

Photo courtesy of MAG/Sean Sutton.

developed as the capacity of the programme, … a gov-

assessing country-specific conditions, designing a transition
plan, developing an implementation plan and monitoring
progress throughout the process.1
Although the degree of control transferred from a mine
action program to national authorities can vary, GICHD defines transition as “the process through which the international community reduces its financial and technical support,
as the affected state develops the required national programme management capabilities that lead to national ownership.”1 Notably, the transition process is not an end goal, nor
does it mark the end of international cooperation. From the
U.N.’s point of view, transition simply characterizes sustainable development, which is often a prerequisite for meeting
mandate objectives.
H. Murphey (Murf) McCloy, an expert on post-conflict and
conventional weapons destruction with the Office of Weapons
Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), explains that the
overall goal of centralizing control of mine action within the
state is threatened by the issue of multiple mine action programs. This can be remedied through the presence of an organization acting as a coordinating authority.2 According to
McCloy, this means that “the arrangements/compromises nec-

pervision and then assume responsibility,” and “a strong national manager who understood the process.”3 According to
PM/WRA, ANAMA’s ability to fund program needs internally and on a long-term basis is perhaps the strongest indicator of the organization’s success.
In most countries, transition may take longer than in
Azerbaijan. In very impoverished countries, national authorities may not consider national ownership of a mine action
program to be a priority. For countries suffering from devastated infrastructures and crippled economies, compensating for the withdrawal of external support from mine action
programs is never easy. However, when international community partners recognize and respect the host nation’s sovereignty, authorities will often feel empowered and remain more
disposed to develop their own capabilities in a constructive
partnership with the international community.2 Alternatively,
in situations where the relationship between the host nation
and international partner was formed under highly autocratic
conditions, local ownership becomes significantly more difficult to achieve.2
On behalf of the state, leadership must be interested

essary to centralize control of mine action within the state and

in and capable of fulfilling clearance obligations.1 Hence,

keep separate programs from operating independently are eas-

to achieve a local buy-in, international donors should

ier to achieve.”2 In the event that local authorities or non-state

first select implementing partners that can empower local

actors exercise control in a loosely defined area independent

national leadership.2 Authorities must also possess a clear

of national authorities, non-state actors may maintain more

understanding of implementation challenges as well as the

influence in their local domains than authorities acting on

financial, technical and human resources necessary to fulfill

behalf of the national government and will often see the finan-

Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,

cial benefits of independent programs, therein rendering the

Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines

centralization of control impossible.2 While otherwise coun-

and on Their Destruction.1 Therefore, donors benefit from

terintuitive, a program truly seeking self-sufficiency must be

communicating with implementing partners and enforcing
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Kurdistan’s Erbil Mine Action Center
The Erbil Mine Action Center (EMAC) of the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency increases mine risk
education efforts in the spring to reduce high casualty rates during this season. EMAC also conducts landmine clearance in Iraqi Kurdistan.
by Jamal J. Hussein [ Erbil Mine Action Center ]

Government (KRG), EMAC issues safety instructions and
MRE teams perform special awareness training in mine and
ERW affected areas.
KRG provides all sustainable funding for mine action
in the Kurdistan region. At IKMAA’s request, some shortduration projects, such as MRE and trainings, received
limited funding from outside parties (e.g., UNICEF,
Handicap International and the Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining). Funding from outside agencies
is not a reliable and ongoing source; funds received vary from
year to year.
Delivering MRE

MRE teams are composed of locally trained staff that follow MRE awareness guidelines provided by EMAC. Beginning
the first week of March and continuing until the end of April,
teams conduct one special MRE session per affected district,
Remnants of bones in the minefield at Choman district, Iraq
(July 2013).
All graphics courtesy of the author.

T

Each district in Kurdistan has its own security checkpoint.
The MRE team provides posters and other MRE instruction

he spring season is a busy time in the Iraqi

to all persons passing through checkpoints. Through tele-

Kurdistan region. Several national holidays, such

vision, radio, security checkpoints and community presen-

as Newroz (Kurdish New Year), fall between March

tations, MRE teams can effectively communicate MRE to

and April, and many Kurds celebrate by enjoying picnics

villagers and communities prior to the spring season.

in mountain locations, green areas and along riverbanks.

In spring 2012, EMAC visited 72 villages to deliver MRE

Similarly, many residents begin planting crops and gath-

and distributed more than 4,600 leaflets, booklets, posters,

ering herbs in the spring, an act that often occurs near or

landmine photos and instructions, which benefited more

within contaminated areas. These outdoor activities result

than 2,000 men, women and children. In March 2013, these

in an increased number of injuries from landmines and ex-

numbers were halved due to snow, rain and other inclement

plosive remnants of war (ERW) during the spring.

weather; therefore, MRE teams could not reach all planned

Erbil Mine Action Center’s Role

sualty rate dropped during the spring seasons of 2011–2013 in

To reduce the number of casualties, the Erbil Mine Action Center (EMAC) at the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action

targets. However, villagers responded positively and the catargeted areas, suggesting that MRE awareness trainings may
have made a difference.

Agency (IKMAA) increased mine risk education (MRE)

EMAC also conducts MRE sessions for schoolteachers and

activities in the spring. Funded by the Kurdistan Regional

students as needed, depending on available funding. In 2012,

https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol18/iss2/1
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ordnance are replicas made from various materials, such as
plastic or wood, that seek to replicate the original appearance
of ordnance. In programs where neither of these resources are
available, classrooms rely on paper or electronic representations. Even when physical training aids are available, the absence of professional teaching tools or materials may mean
that these aids are not used to full potential.
Inert ordnance. Inert ordnance training aids are handmade craft products. Because quality, functionality and appearance vary significantly, the products have inconsistent
instructional value. Other issues associated with inert training aids include:
1. Limited supply of donor ordnance
2. Requirement of highly specialized technicians
for production
3. Inherent risk to technicians
4. Labor-intensive craftsmanship (2–20 or more hours for
one item)
5. International shipping regulations that severely
limit distribution
The SOTS instructor support materials are based on active
learning pedagogy, which requires students to be active participants in the learning process. One exercise presented in
this approach is to let students assemble the models before receiving instruction and then allow students to explain how they
think it operates.

To meet these objectives, most nations operate one or more

as the issues listed above, inert ordnance training aids
cannot be distributed in quantities meeting the global need.
Additional factors limit usefulness of inert ordnance for
basic-level EOD training:
1. The complexity and small size of internal mechanisms

EOD schools. In the Asia-Pacific region, EOD schools contin-

obscures tactile observation of the device’s function.

ue to request donor assistance for facility and infrastructure

2. The fragility of inert ordnance prevents repeated disas-

improvement, curriculum development and third-party tech-

sembly, which is particularly acute in complex mecha-

nical advisers and instructors. These assistance packages of-

nisms (fuzes were never designed for disassembly).

ten lack affordable and effective hands-on training materials.

3. Conventional machining and fuze composition limits

Inert ordnance training aids from Golden West Humani-

the degree to which the device can be cut away to expose

tarian Foundation’s (Golden West) extensive library are often

functional components.

requested by humanitarian operators. Unfortunately, due to

Replicas. Ordnance replicas generally consist of one or

factors detailed in this report, distribution of these materi-

more parts that amalgamate the fuzing mechanisms of the

als is limited. Golden West has struggled to find a solution to
this problem.
The Advanced Ordnance Teaching Materials (AOTM) program aims to close the gap between the availability and need
for EOD education, and endeavors to bring a set of universally applicable training materials to the EOD community. Ultimately, by improving the quality of EOD instruction, AOTM

item they represent. Replicas are commonly nonfunctioning;
the components representing any fuze mechanisms have very
limited or no mechanical functionality relative to the item
they represent.
Typical production of replica ordnance employs hobby
techniques such as silicone mold production for resin casting,
while wood turning and other labor-intensive methods have

will increase operator safety within the profession.

also been used. Historically, lack of cost-effective fabrication

Training Aids

mechanically complex replicas.

methods for small-batch production limits manufacture of

The highest quality training aids currently available are

Replicas excel at representing mechanically simple items

created by removing explosive materials from live ordnance,

such as projectile bodies, improvised explosive devices and

a practice known as inerting. The closest alternative to inert

simple ordnance fuzing (such as mines utilizing Bellville
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springs).1 There is a notable market
absence for items such as mechanical
time fuzes.
Due to the accuracy of their external appearance, replicas are primarily useful for teaching ordnance
identification during basic-level EOD
education. Ordnance identification is
important but does not substitute for a
comprehensive understanding of fuze
functioning. Moreover, the current
range of capabilities represented in
most replicas cannot adequately illustrate fuze functionality.
Publications. Publications are a
pillar of EOD education and one of
the most valuable resources available
to field operators. The humanitarian
community primarily relies on publications such as ORDATA II and unclassified military documents.2 While a

A student from the Cambodian Mine Action Centre explores the mechanism in a
vane armed bomb fuze during IMAS EOD level 1 training.

critical source of information about specific ordnance items

set includes 10 models representing the most common fuzing

for advanced EOD operators, publications have significant

mechanisms found in ordnance. While these mechanisms are

limitations for teaching basic fuze functionality to entry-

true to generic fuze functionality, they are not specific to any

level trainees.

single fuze design.

The level of formal education among EOD students in

SOTS includes a comprehensive set of instructional resourc-

post-conflict developing nations, in which the majority of

es to ensure students receive the best possible education. These

the sector’s work takes place, is another factor limiting use-

support materials include lesson plans, multimedia materi-

fulness of publications for entry-level education. In countries
with low exposure to formal education and literacy (such as
Cambodia and its civil-war generation), Golden West EOD
instructors found that traditional teaching methods relying on written materials are significantly more difficult than
“hands-on” methods. Even in countries where students acclimate to using print sources, the value of physical training materials remains undisputed.
AOTM Approach

AOTM identifies two distinct categories for ordnance
training materials
1. Aids that teach generic ordnance and fuze functionality
(PIBD, MT, BD, etc.)
2. Aids that teach ordnance-specific functionality (i.e.,
how an MJ-1 rocket fuze functions, etc.)

als (i.e., PowerPoint presentation slides), quizzes and exercises.
The set also includes open-source reference materials. The entire SOTS package is delivered in a single Pelican CaseTM for easy
transport and storage in field conditions worldwide.
The SOTS package is tailored to meet the learning objectives
of the European Committee for Standardization Workshop
Agreement (CWA) for EOD Competency Standards for Humanitarian Mine Action Levels 1 and 2.3 This training set addresses
CWA EOD Knowledge Base Competency Standards for

• Explosive ordnance recognition
• Explosives theory and safe handling of explosives
Addressing specific fuzes, the second category of training
models is more applicable to high-risk munitions where EOD
operators need precise knowledge. Another application trains
EOD teams on threats specific to their area of responsibil-

AOTM addresses both categories. The first deals with

ity. To serve these purposes, AOTM is building a database

generalized fuze functionality, which is a universal require-

of 3-D ordnance models true to the original items. Some of

ment for all basic EOD education and is addressed through

the models are ready, but the goal is for the database to con-

creation of a Standard Ordnance Training Set (SOTS). This

tinue growing and serving the community’s needs. These can
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Using MINEHOUND in
Cambodia and Afghanistan
The HALO Trust uses the MINEHOUND dual sensor detector in Cambodia and Afghanistan to reduce falsealarm rates. MINEHOUND combines a metal detector with ground-penetrating radar to improve efficiency
of mine removal in areas highly contaminated with metallic false alarms.

by David Daniels [ Cobham Technical Services ], Jürgen Braunstein [ Vallon GmbH ] and Michael Nevard [ The HALO Trust ]

duct initial HALO field trials in Cambodia. Since
2012, the U.S. Army’s Humanitarian Demining
Research and Development (HD R&D) Program,
which extended the project to Afghanistan, have
also supported them.
Development

ERA Technology started developing the
dual sensor MINEHOUND detector in 2001
based on its expertise in the use of radar for
landmine detection and by careful observation
of humanitarian deminers in action. The aim was
to fully utilize the deminer’s skill while avoiding
the complexity involved in operating current
hand-held GPR systems and reducing reliance
on software-driven auto-calibration. Using a
radically different approach from conventional
GPR designs regarding user interface, the detector
employs a novel, audio-interface technique.
The original prototype detector combined
output from an off-the-shelf MD and an ERA
Technology-developed GPR with the design aim
of offering considerable improvements in detection performance and a significant reduction in
false alarms. A key element in the design philosophy was the need to avoid an expensive, complex
and potentially distracting image display and to
implement GPR design that mimics operation
of a conventional MD. This was achieved using
A MINEHOUND VMR2 is used to find AP mines in Cambodia. The use of this system allows 92%
an audio output in which the pitch of the output
of signals from metallic rubbish to be rapidly excavated.
represents target depth and amplitude represents
All graphics courtesy of the authors.
target size. The U.K. Department for International Development sponsored the initial trial element of the MINEhe vast majority of humanitarian mine clearance is conducted
HOUND project, and proving trials were carried out in Angola, Bosnia
by manual deminers primarily using metal detectors. Increasand Cambodia between 2005 and 2006.
ing clearance rates of manual deminers is one of the primaAs the initial trials were successful in live minefields, focus shifted
ry ways organizations can improve effectiveness and efficiency. For this
from demonstrating the dual sensor technology (i.e., MD and GPR) to
purpose, The HALO Trust (HALO) has used MINEHOUND VMR2 and
simplifying it for nonscientific operators. Prototypes from 2001 to 2005
VMR3 dual sensor landmine detectors in Cambodia since 2010 and in
were A, B, C and D models, indicating the technology’s advancement.
Afghanistan since 2012. The detector proved to be an adaptable and reliThe D model was MINEHOUND VMR1, first produced in November
able means of increasing manual clearance rates.
2005. GPR setup required a laptop, which was linked to the detector via a
MINEHOUND is comprised of an integrated metal detector (MD)
cable. Since multiple setups were needed throughout the day, setup prodesigned, developed and manufactured by Vallon GmbH, and groundcedure was too cumbersome for routine detector usage.1
penetrating radar (GPR) designed and developed by ERA TechnoloIn July 2006, MINEHOUND VMR2 was fielded; this was the first
gy (now Cobham Technical Services or CTS). The integrated MD was
operable MINEHOUND without using external devices. Due to its cafirst produced in 2004 and has been continuously improved to meet
the needs of demining operators. Vallon and CTS collaborated to conpacity for finding not only objects containing metal but completely

T
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metal-free objects too, VMR2 was useful during searches for improvised
explosive devices or their components.
After VMR2 proved successful, Vallon developed a lighter version
using plastic injection-molded casings for the main electronic compartment. At the same time, CTS developed a more powerful GPR subsystem, allowing for implementation of more sophisticated algorithms
for signal processing. Vallon and CTS modernized the display and further facilitated the operation, which was integrated into MINEHOUND
VMR3. Production of VMR3 started in May 2010.
Technology

MINEHOUND combines advanced technology—a dual sensor MD
and GPR—into one system designed specifically for use in humanitarian demining operations. MD and GPR emit audio-signal output to
the operator. The detector is designed to operate initially in MD mode,
where all metal threats are noted. GPR mode then confirms presence
of a threat. MD audio gives accurate positioning information and can
indicate a mass of metal. GPR provides accurate positional and depth
information, including information on the target’s radar cross section.
GPR responds to even the smallest mines buried flush with the soil but
does not respond to small metal fragments. This results in the rejection
of false alarms caused by metallic clutter such as cartridge casings, small
pieces of shrapnel and metallic debris.
The operator can choose to work exclusively with MD, GPR or both
simultaneously. Furthermore, a gated mode is available in which GPR is
only activated when MD detects metal. This mode minimizes the number of undesired GPR alarms, as it is only active when required. VMR3
has a ready-to-use operational weight of just under 4 kg. With more than
8 hours of operation, a customized rechargeable battery powers the detector without requiring frequent recharging.
MD of VMR3 has a semiautomatic setup procedure for mineralized
soils, which can adapt to current soil conditions in less than 30 seconds.
The specific setup for soil is kept in VMR3’s nonvolatile memory, hence
setup for mineralized soil is only necessary when soil changes, but not
after turning the system on or off.
GPR of VMR3 has optional, advanced setup parameters, allowing
users to tailor the system to the requested detection needs and facilitating the increase of clutter-rejection efficiency. Not only can GPR sensitivity be adjusted but also the detection depth. Two parameters offer
selections for detection depth: depth from where to start giving alarms
(start point) and depth that will not be exceeded (stop point). Start point
is used if detection is carried out under a safe layer, such as snow or gravel. Stop point is used to limit detection depth. If objects below the stop
point cause GPR alarms, they are automatically ignored.
AP Minefields in Cambodia

HALO first began MINEHOUND trials in Cambodia in August
2010. Vallon and CTS personnel provided training and technical support in the field. Cambodia was chosen as the location for trials, as
HALO has successfully used dual sensor detectors with GPR—the U.S.
Army’s Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS)—
since 2006 in Cambodia. HALO started working with three VMR2 detectors on loan from Vallon and CTS, and from the beginning of 2012,
the U.S. Army’s HD R&D program provided two additional VMR3 detectors and extra support for the MINEHOUND project in Cambodia.
MINEHOUND detectors were trialed across HALO’s area of operations in northwestern Cambodia (Banteay Meanchey, Battambang,
Oddar Meanchey and Pailin provinces) on minefields containing primarily anti-personnel (AP) blast mines. The minefields were chosen to
provide a range of soil and vegetation conditions as well as varying levels
of metal contamination and different mine threats.
For each minefield, a GPR calibration area was created to determine appropriate GPR-sensitivity settings for the mine threat and soil
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Deminers in Cambodia are taught how to calibrate the GPR on the MINEHOUND VMR3 using buried test targets chosen for the expected threat
in the minefield.

conditions. Calibration test pieces provided with MINEHOUND were
used together with nonexplosive mine targets. Smaller mine targets with
a reduced radar cross section are more difficult to find with GPR, as are
targets flush with the surface of soil. Therefore two calibration targets
of each expected type were buried: one flush with the surface and one
at the national clearance depth (13 cm in Cambodia). The GPR was then
adjusted, so that all targets were audible with GPR while also minimizing the number of false alarms on surrounding soil. HALO’s procedures
require regular checking of the GPR calibration throughout the work
day, since variations in soil temperature and moisture can significantly
change sensor performance.
HALO’s existing linear clearance methods, sometimes called lateral
clearance, comprise marking a 70-cm deep strip of uncleared minefield
up to 30-m long (a bound) adjoining cleared ground. Vegetation along
the bound is removed with a strimmer (brush cutter), and then a deminer searches the area using a standard hand-held metal detector from
HALO’s existing fleet of Ebinger and Minelab detectors. The deminer
places a red wooden disc (chip) on the center of each metal signal, a process known as mapping the bound.
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Teams with MINEHOUND support cleared 573,109 sq m
from August 2010 to December 2013 and encountered 661,890
metal signals, of which 92% were marked as clutter with blue
90.0
x Minehound
chips. In addition, 845 landmines and other explosive rem80.0
x Standard Detectors
nants of war (ERW) were correctly identified. There have been
70.0
no incidents where the detector has incorrectly indicated a
60.0
metal signal when it was actually a landmine. The vast ma50.0
jority of ERW found were AP blast mines (Type 72 AP, PMN,
PMN-2, MD-82B, MN-79, PMD-6), but some were fragmenta40.0
tion mines (Type 69, POMZ), anti-tank (AT) mines (TM-46)
30.0
and other ammunition, such as mortars.
20.0
The proportion of metal signals that were not mines, yet
10.0
were correctly marked with blue chips and could be rapidly excavated, increased from a low of 78% in 2010 to 95% in 2013.
0.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Overall this clutter-rejection rate is not expected to increase
Number of metal signals per m
significantly in the future, although some variation exists beFigure 1. Area cleared per deminer per day.
tween minefields and conditions.
The area of ground cleared by a deminer each day heavily
70
depends on signal density: the number of metal signals in the
soil at the site. Heavily contaminated areas require more time
Productivity Increases due to Minehound
to excavate metal signals and thus less ground can be cleared
60
per day. This is true even when a proportion of the metal signals can be rapidly excavated as is possible when using MINE50
Standard Demining
HOUND. Figure 1 shows the results of MINEHOUND teams
Minehound Assisted
in 2012 and 2013. Each cross represents one day’s work for a
40
MINEHOUND team. The overall trend in productivity as signal density increases can be clearly seen. Figure 1 also reveals
30
that, most of the time, the teams worked in areas with signal
densities within the range of 0.5–2.5 signals per sq m. The red
20
crosses in the same figure show a sample of comparative results
for standard metal detectors. These are clustered much more in
10
the range of 0.0–0.5 signals per sq m; at higher signal densities
the MINEHOUND clearance rates are generally higher.
0
Although like-for-like comparisons have somewhat limited
0.5
1.0
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2.0
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3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
value
due to the number of variables affecting clearance rates,
Number of metal signals per m
Figure 2 illustrates the relative productivity of different methFigure 2. Productivity increases due to MINEHOUND.
ods for different signal densities. When metal signals are relatively few, the advantage of using MINEHOUND is small and
Once the mapping is complete, the MINEHOUND operator goes
usually involves a 10–20% boost in clearance rates. However, producto each red disc first to check the signal location with the metal detectivity is doubled in areas with more metal. A standard clearance team
tor function of MINEHOUND and then to check for a GPR return. The
consists of nine deminers, one of whom is usually cutting vegetation
detector head’s center is scanned over the red disc from two different
with a strimmer. While MINEHOUND teams also have nine deminers,
angles to ensure signal level consistency. If any GPR sound is heard,
one uses MINEHOUND and another conducts rapid excavation of blue
which might indicate presence of a mine, the red chip is left in place.
chips. These productivity figures consider each deminer equally.
If no GPR audio signal is emitted, the red disc is replaced with a blue
one. Once this chip-flipping process is complete, the ground under the
Limitations
red discs (the true alarms) is investigated using standard manual exIn general, HALO found MINEHOUND to be effective for the macavation methods. The blue discs (false alarms) are then rapidly excajority of Cambodia’s terrain types and mine threats. However, it canvated using an adapted brush cutter with a digging head, (also known
not be efficiently used in some conditions. In minefields with very rocky
as a clutternator).
ground, it is not always possible to find space to swing the detector head
This clearance method allows one MINEHOUND operator to
over metal signals at the optimum height for GPR to function correctly.
check signals in the bounds of up to five other deminers and thus
Such metal signals cannot be marked as clutter, negatively affecting the
increase clearance rates, as the majority of signals are checked and
clutter-rejection rate and thus the overall clearance rates. Moreover, soil
excavated in a matter of seconds rather than minutes.
with a very uneven surface—for example, old plowed furrows hardened
over time—can be very challenging for GPR. In these conditions, tuning
Results in Cambodia
out false alarms from the soil surface is sometimes impossible while corTrials in Cambodia started in August 2010, and the initial three
rectly identifying small AP mines flush with the surface. Both of these
months were conducted as a data-collection exercise in live minefields.
minefield types are the exception rather than the rule in HALO’s area of
This was done without rapid excavation of blue chips, which was introoperations in Cambodia; hence, moving teams to areas where they can
duced in October 2010 after sufficient confidence had been gained in the
be more effective is possible.
system’s capabilities and reliability. Since then, all clearance has been in
Good MINEHOUND performance almost entirely depends on
fully live conditions.
correct GPR calibration. This procedure is somewhat subtle, reArea Cleared per Deminer per Day

Area (m2) cleared

100.0

Area (m2) cleared per deminer per day

2

2
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quiring a detailed understanding of various settings and factors that can affect radar
signal. Learning how to do this takes time,
but HALO’s Cambodian training team has
taught new operators effectively. Actually
using the detector to check metal signals is
very straightforward and does not require
any difficult techniques.
AT Minefields in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, HALO is trialing
MINEHOUND detectors to assist with clearance of minimum-metal AT mines. This work
is concentrated in the western province of
Herat, where the Mujahedeen sparsely laid
minimum-metal AT mines, in particular the
Italian TC series and other low-metal AT
mines, over large areas in the 1980s to impede
Soviet military action across the desert plains.
Although the density of mines is very low,
they continue to cause accidents, often with
multiple fatalities, and block access to valuable agricultural land.
The mine threat and very different soil and
conditions, which include dry sandy soils and
gravel with rocks but little vegetation, provide a different challenge for MINEHOUND
when compared to Cambodia. HALO has
A MINEHOUND VMR3 in an AT minefield in Afghanistan. The large size of the expected mines
two VMR3 detectors in Afghanistan as part
means that the GPR can be calibrated to ignore nearly all other signals.
of an operational field evaluation in conjunction with HD R&D. They are currently used in
Results in Afghanistan
minefields that do not contain AP mines. Method of use is similar to
From the beginning of the trial in September 2012 through the end
Cambodia in that MINEHOUND checks positive signals that were preof December 2013, two MINEHOUND detectors checked 197,044 metal
viously identified by Minelab F3S detectors, which are sensitive enough
signals and marked 99% as clutter. Six minimum-metal AT mines were
to find all AT mine types required.
found, and 432,082 sq m of minefield were cleared. On average, 32,841
However, calibration of MINEHOUND’s GPR in Afghanistan is difmetal signals were encountered for each mine found; all except 321 of
ferent than in Cambodia. Two explosive-free TC 2.4 AT mines, with
these could be excavated by shovel.
their main explosive charge replaced with lime mortar, were used as calThe Afghanistan results show a generally higher clutter-rejection rate
ibration targets. One was buried at a depth of 20 cm, while the other was
than in Cambodia. This is most likely due to larger radar cross section
flush with the surface of the soil. This calibration meant that only very
of AT mines, which effectively increases probability of detection while
large anomalies in the soil or large metal items would give GPR return.
also reducing probability of a false alarm. Because the calibration targets
The TC 2.4 is used for calibration, as it has the smallest cross section of
are much larger, GPR can be set at a far less sensitive setting than if AP
the expected mine types.
targets were used. The consistent minefield terrain, weather conditions
MINEHOUND detectors in Herat are deployed in support of manand lack of vegetation and roots likely contributed to this. The large, flat
ual deminers who are searching ground using Minelab F3S detectors.
areas forming the majority of the minefields in Herat make them ideal
The deminers place red chips on metal signals, and MINEHOUND
for MINEHOUND. The few false alarms giving a GPR return were most
is then used to check for a GPR return. If GPR return is positive, the
often large pieces of metal fragmentation, scrap or plastic containers with
operator leaves the red chip in place; if negative, the operator leaves
a foil layer.
a blue chip. Red chips are investigated carefully using standard excavation techniques; blue chips are removed rapidly using a shovel. One
Conclusion
MINEHOUND can support more than 20 deminers employing this
Trial results reported from Cambodia and Afghanistan show that
methodology.
MINEHOUND is extremely effective in reducing the false alarm rate enTrials have been conducted on MINEHOUND GPR ground-search
countered by generic metal detectors. Average reduction in false alarm
methods that omit use of a metal detector. Although believed to be
rate was better than 90% in Cambodia on AP minefields and 99% in
reliable, this method is not suited for most scenarios, as the detector can
Afghanistan on AT minefields. HALO’s method of operation is a major
only sweep relatively slowly due to GPR’s limited detection area. This
component of this outcome. Using MINEHOUND as a confirmatory demeans that a single MINEHOUND can only cover about 250 sq m per
tector to filter out false alarms enables a highly cost-effective deployment.
day. While this may have an advantage in areas with very high levels of
Rapid excavation of false alarms is the main reason for increased producmetal contamination, it is more efficient to have MINEHOUND support
tivity. HALO is actively looking at extending trials and deployment of
20 other deminers marking positive signals using other detectors in areas
MINEHOUND to other parts of its global operations to take advantage
with less metal. In this way MINEHOUND can assist with clearance of
of customizable GPR.
more than 700 sq m of ground per day.
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Although the MINEHOUND is significantly more expensive to purchase than standard MD, the improved productivity and
reduction in labor required for clearing highly contaminated minefields should cover the
cost of the initial investment within one to
two years. In the future, overall cost per
square meter should be reduced in areas with
high signal densities compared to using standard MD alone.
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